Investigates insider threat incidents involving employees, contractors, or trusted partners who misuse authorized access to steal data, sabotage systems, or violate security policies. Combines digital forensics, user behavior analytics, and HR/legal coordination to build an evidence-based case. Activates for requests involving insider threat investigation, employee data theft, privilege misuse, user behavior anomaly, or internal threat detection.
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Before installing skills in Cursor, ensure your development environment meets these requirements:
node --versionperforming-insider-threat-investigationExecute the skills CLI command in your project's root directory to begin installation:
Fetches performing-insider-threat-investigation from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills and configures it for Cursor.
The CLI shows a list of agents. Use arrow keys and space to select Cursor:
Confirm successful installation by checking the skill directory location:
Restart Cursor to activate performing-insider-threat-investigation. Access via /performing-insider-threat-investigation in your agent's command palette.
We perform automated surface-level scans (Gen AI Scanner, Socket, Snyk) during installation. These checks detect common vulnerabilities but do not guarantee complete security. Always review skill source code and verify the publisher's reputation before production use.
Skills execute code in your environment. Always review source, verify the publisher, and test in isolation before production.
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| name | performing-insider-threat-investigation |
| description | 'Investigates insider threat incidents involving employees, contractors, or trusted partners who misuse authorized access to steal data, sabotage systems, or violate security policies. Combines digital forensics, user behavior analytics, and HR/legal coordination to build an evidence-based case. Activates for requests involving insider threat investigation, employee data theft, privilege misuse, user behavior anomaly, or internal threat detection. ' |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | incident-response |
| tags | - insider-threat - user-behavior-analytics - data-exfiltration - privilege-misuse - DFIR |
| mitre_attack | - T1078 - T1048 - T1567 - T1114 |
| version | 1.0.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | - RS.MA-01 - RS.MA-02 - RS.AN-03 - RC.RP-01 |
Do not use for external attacker investigations where compromised credentials are used without insider collusion; use standard incident response procedures instead.
Document the initial report and validate before proceeding:
Investigation Authorization:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Case ID: INV-2025-042
Subject: [Employee Name] - [Title] - [Department]
Allegation: Unauthorized transfer of proprietary data to personal cloud storage
Reported By: DLP system alert + manager concern
Legal Approval: [Counsel Name] - 2025-11-15
HR Liaison: [HR Name]
Scope: File access and transfer activity from 2025-10-01 to present
Systems in Scope: Workstation, email, cloud storage, VPN, DLP logs
Gather evidence without alerting the subject to the investigation:
Log-Based Evidence (non-intrusive):
User Activity Monitoring (requires legal approval):
Endpoint Forensics (if warranted by evidence):
Build a behavioral profile comparing normal vs. anomalous activity:
Behavioral Analysis:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Normal Baseline (6-month average):
- Login time: 08:30-09:00 weekdays
- Files accessed: 15-25 per day (marketing department files)
- Email volume: 45 sent, 80 received per day
- Data transferred: 50MB per day average
- USB usage: None
Investigation Period (last 30 days):
- Login time: 22:00-02:00 (after hours, multiple occasions)
- Files accessed: 200+ per day (finance, engineering, executive files)
- Email volume: 120 sent per day (30% to personal gmail)
- Data transferred: 2.5GB per day average
- USB usage: 3 unique devices connected (Kingston DataTraveler)
- Print jobs: 847 pages (competitor analysis, customer lists, source code)
Anomaly Score: 94/100 (Critical)
Build a chronological timeline of the subject's actions:
Timeline of Activity:
2025-10-15 Subject submits resignation (2-week notice)
2025-10-16 First after-hours login at 23:15, accessed engineering Git repository
2025-10-17 USB device (Kingston DT 64GB) first connected at 23:30
2025-10-18 DLP alert: 450 files copied to USB, including CAD drawings
2025-10-19 200+ emails forwarded to personal Gmail account
2025-10-20 Google Drive desktop client installed, syncing corporate SharePoint
2025-10-22 Accessed executive SharePoint site (not normally accessed)
2025-10-25 Second USB device connected, 2.1GB transferred
2025-10-28 Print job: 847 pages including customer contact database
Evaluate the severity and coordinate the response with HR and legal:
Impact Assessment:
Response Options (determined by legal and HR):
Ensure all evidence meets legal admissibility standards:
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Insider Threat | Risk posed by individuals with authorized access who intentionally or unintentionally cause harm to the organization |
| User Behavior Analytics (UBA) | Technology that analyzes user activity patterns to detect anomalies indicating potential insider threats |
| Data Loss Prevention (DLP) | Technology that monitors, detects, and blocks unauthorized transfer of sensitive data outside the organization |
| Legal Hold | Directive to preserve all relevant evidence and suspend normal document destruction policies during an investigation |
| Need to Know | Information access principle restricting insider threat investigation details to only authorized team members |
| Exfiltration Vector | Method used to move data outside the organization: USB, email, cloud storage, print, screen capture, photography |
Context: A senior software engineer with access to critical repositories submits a two-week resignation notice. The engineering manager reports that the engineer has been working unusual hours and downloading large amounts of code.
Approach:
Pitfalls:
INSIDER THREAT INVESTIGATION REPORT
=====================================
Case ID: INV-2025-042
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL - Need to Know Only
Subject: [Name Redacted] - Senior Engineer
Investigation Period: 2025-10-01 to 2025-10-28
Investigator: [Name]
Legal Counsel: [Name]
HR Liaison: [Name]
ALLEGATION
Unauthorized exfiltration of proprietary source code and customer
data following resignation submission.
EVIDENCE SUMMARY
1. Git logs: 47 repositories cloned (vs. baseline of 3)
2. USB transfers: 4.6 GB across 3 unique devices over 12 sessions
3. Email: 200+ emails with attachments forwarded to personal Gmail
4. Cloud: Google Drive sync client installed, syncing corporate files
5. Print: 847 pages including customer contact database
6. Physical access: After-hours badge access on 8 of 12 workdays
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
[Baseline vs. anomalous activity comparison]
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Data Classification: Confidential (source code, customer PII)
Estimated Volume: 7.2 GB exfiltrated
Regulatory Impact: Potential GDPR notification (customer PII)
Business Impact: Competitive advantage at risk
TIMELINE
[Chronological event listing]
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. [Legal/HR decision on employment action]
2. [Evidence preservation actions]
3. [Regulatory notification assessment]
4. [Access control improvements]
Prerequisites
Time Estimate
15-45 minutes depending on use case complexity
Steps
Common Pitfalls
✓ Do
✗ Don't
💡 Pro Tips
✓ Use when
Use when skill capabilities match your task, clear ROI on time saved, and you can validate outputs. Best for repetitive tasks, learning, and quality improvement.
✗ Avoid when
Avoid when task requires deep expertise you can't validate, involves sensitive decisions, or when learning process is more valuable than speed of completion.
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
We added performing-insider-threat-investigation from the explainx registry; install was straightforward and the SKILL.md answered most questions upfront.
I recommend performing-insider-threat-investigation for anyone iterating fast on agent tooling; clear intent and a small, reviewable surface area.
Registry listing for performing-insider-threat-investigation matched our evaluation — installs cleanly and behaves as described in the markdown.
performing-insider-threat-investigation fits our agent workflows well — practical, well scoped, and easy to wire into existing repos.
Useful defaults in performing-insider-threat-investigation — fewer surprises than typical one-off scripts, and it plays nicely with `npx skills` flows.
performing-insider-threat-investigation fits our agent workflows well — practical, well scoped, and easy to wire into existing repos.
Registry listing for performing-insider-threat-investigation matched our evaluation — installs cleanly and behaves as described in the markdown.
performing-insider-threat-investigation has been reliable in day-to-day use. Documentation quality is above average for community skills.
performing-insider-threat-investigation is among the better-maintained entries we tried; worth keeping pinned for repeat workflows.
Keeps context tight: performing-insider-threat-investigation is the kind of skill you can hand to a new teammate without a long onboarding doc.
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