| name | implementing-passwordless-auth-with-microsoft-entra |
| description | 'Implements passwordless authentication using Microsoft Entra ID with FIDO2 security keys, Windows Hello for Business, Microsoft Authenticator passkeys, and certificate-based authentication to eliminate password-based attacks. Activates for requests involving passwordless deployment, FIDO2 passkey configuration, phishing-resistant MFA, or Microsoft Entra authentication method policies. ' |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | identity-access-management |
| tags | - passwordless - FIDO2 - passkeys - Microsoft-Entra - Windows-Hello - phishing-resistant-MFA |
| version | '1.0' |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | - PR.AA-01 - PR.AA-02 - PR.AA-05 - PR.AA-06 |
Implementing Passwordless Auth with Microsoft Entra
When to Use
- Organization wants to eliminate password-based attacks (phishing, credential stuffing, brute force)
- Regulatory or internal mandate requires phishing-resistant MFA (Executive Order 14028, CISA guidance)
- Deploying FIDO2 security keys or Windows Hello for Business across the enterprise
- Migrating from legacy MFA (SMS, phone call) to phishing-resistant authentication methods
- Implementing passkey support for hybrid or cloud-joined Windows devices
- Reducing helpdesk costs from password reset requests
Do not use for environments that cannot support modern authentication protocols; legacy applications using NTLM or basic authentication must be migrated first.
Prerequisites
- Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license (Azure AD Premium)
- Windows 10/11 22H2+ for Windows Hello for Business deployment
- FIDO2-compliant security keys (YubiKey 5 Series, Feitian BioPass, Google Titan)
- Microsoft Authenticator app 6.8+ for passkey support on iOS 16+/Android 14+
- Hybrid Azure AD join or Azure AD join configured for Windows devices
- Conditional Access policies configured for authentication strength
Workflow
Step 1: Configure Authentication Methods Policy
Enable passwordless authentication methods in Microsoft Entra:
# Connect to Microsoft Graph
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Policy.ReadWrite.AuthenticationMethod", "User.ReadWrite.All"
# Enable FIDO2 Security Key authentication method
$fido2Policy = @{
"@odata.type" = "#microsoft.graph.fido2AuthenticationMethodConfiguration"
state = "enabled"
isAttestationEnforced = $true
isSelfServiceRegistrationAllowed = $true
keyRestrictions = @{
isEnforced = $true
enforcementType = "allow"
aaGuids = @(
"cb69481e-8ff7-4039-93ec-0a2729a154a8", # YubiKey 5 Series
"ee882879-721c-4913-9775-3dfcce97072a", # YubiKey 5 NFC
"fa2b99dc-9e39-4257-8f92-4a30d23c4118", # YubiKey 5C NFC
"2fc0579f-8113-47ea-b116-bb5a8db9202a", # YubiKey Bio
"73bb0cd4-e502-49b8-9c6f-b59445bf720b" # Google Titan
)
}
includeTargets = @(
@{
targetType = "group"
id = "all_users" # Or specific security group ID
}
)
}
Update-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicyAuthenticationMethodConfiguration `
-AuthenticationMethodConfigurationId "fido2" `
-BodyParameter $fido2Policy
# Enable Microsoft Authenticator with passkey support
$authenticatorPolicy = @{
"@odata.type" = "#microsoft.graph.microsoftAuthenticatorAuthenticationMethodConfiguration"
state = "enabled"
featureSettings = @{
displayAppInformationRequiredState = @{
state = "enabled"
includeTarget = @{
targetType = "group"
id = "all_users"
}
}
displayLocationInformationRequiredState = @{
state = "enabled"
includeTarget = @{
targetType = "group"
id = "all_users"
}
}
companionAppAllowedState = @{
state = "enabled"
}
}
includeTargets = @(
@{
targetType = "group"
id = "all_users"
authenticationMode = "any"
}
)
}
Update-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicyAuthenticationMethodConfiguration `
-AuthenticationMethodConfigurationId "microsoftAuthenticator" `
-BodyParameter $authenticatorPolicy
# Enable Windows Hello for Business
$whfbPolicy = @{
"@odata.type" = "#microsoft.graph.windowsHelloForBusinessAuthenticationMethodConfiguration"
state = "enabled"
pinMinimumLength = 6
pinMaximumLength = 127
pinLowercaseCharactersUsage = "allowed"
pinUppercaseCharactersUsage = "allowed"
pinSpecialCharactersUsage = "allowed"
securityKeyForSignIn = "enabled"
includeTargets = @(
@{
targetType = "group"
id = "all_users"
}
)
}
Update-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicyAuthenticationMethodConfiguration `
-AuthenticationMethodConfigurationId "windowsHelloForBusiness" `
-BodyParameter $whfbPolicy
Write-Host "Passwordless authentication methods enabled successfully"
Step 2: Configure Authentication Strength Conditional Access
Create Conditional Access policies requiring phishing-resistant authentication:
# Create custom authentication strength for phishing-resistant MFA
$authStrength = @{
displayName = "Phishing-Resistant Passwordless"
description = "Requires FIDO2, WHfB, or certificate-based authentication"
allowedCombinations = @(
"fido2",
"windowsHelloForBusiness",
"x509CertificateMultiFactor"
)
requirementsSatisfied = "mfa"
}
$strengthPolicy = New-MgPolicyAuthenticationStrengthPolicy -BodyParameter $authStrength
# Create Conditional Access policy requiring phishing-resistant auth
$caPolicy = @{
displayName = "Require Phishing-Resistant Auth for All Apps"
state = "enabledForReportingButNotEnforced" # Start in report-only
conditions = @{
users = @{
includeUsers = @("All")
excludeGroups = @("Passwordless-Exclusion-Group")
}
applications = @{
includeApplications = @("All")
}
clientAppTypes = @("browser", "mobileAppsAndDesktopClients")
}
grantControls = @{
operator = "OR"
authenticationStrength = @{
id = $strengthPolicy.Id
}
}
}
New-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy -BodyParameter $caPolicy
# Create stricter policy for admin portals
$adminPolicy = @{
displayName = "Require Security Key for Admin Access"
state = "enabled"
conditions = @{
users = @{
includeRoles = @(
"62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10", # Global Admin
"194ae4cb-b126-40b2-bd5b-6091b380977d", # Security Admin
"f28a1f50-f6e7-4571-818b-6a12f2af6b6c", # SharePoint Admin
"29232cdf-9323-42fd-ade2-1d097af3e4de" # Exchange Admin
)
}
applications = @{
includeApplications = @(
"797f4846-ba00-4fd7-ba43-dac1f8f63013", # Azure Portal
"00000006-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000", # Microsoft 365 Admin
"0000000a-0000-0000-c000-000000000000" # Entra Admin Center
)
}
}
grantControls = @{
operator = "OR"
authenticationStrength = @{
id = $strengthPolicy.Id
}
}
sessionControls = @{
signInFrequency = @{
value = 4
type = "hours"
isEnabled = $true
}
}
}
New-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy -BodyParameter $adminPolicy
Step 3: Deploy Windows Hello for Business via Intune
Configure WHfB deployment through Microsoft Intune MDM:
# Create Windows Hello for Business configuration profile in Intune
$whfbProfile = @{
"@odata.type" = "#microsoft.graph.windowsIdentityProtectionConfiguration"
displayName = "WHfB - Enterprise Deployment"
description = "Windows Hello for Business configuration for all managed devices"
useSecurityKeyForSignin = $true
windowsHelloForBusinessBlocked = $false
pinMinimumLength = 6
pinMaximumLength = 127
pinUppercaseCharactersUsage = "allowed"
pinLowercaseCharactersUsage = "allowed"
pinSpecialCharactersUsage = "allowed"
enhancedAntiSpoofingForFacialFeaturesEnabled = $true
pinRecoveryEnabled = $true
securityDeviceRequired = $true # Require TPM
unlockWithBiometricsEnabled = $true
useCertificatesForOnPremisesAuthEnabled = $true # For hybrid scenarios
# Cloud Kerberos Trust for hybrid join (recommended over key trust)
windowsHelloForBusinessAuthenticationMethod = "cloudKerberosTrust"
}
# Create the configuration profile
$profile = New-MgDeviceManagementDeviceConfiguration -BodyParameter $whfbProfile
# Assign to all Windows devices
$assignment = @{
target = @{
"@odata.type" = "#microsoft.graph.allDevicesAssignmentTarget"
}
}
New-MgDeviceManagementDeviceConfigurationAssignment `
-DeviceConfigurationId $profile.Id `
-BodyParameter $assignment
# Configure Cloud Kerberos Trust (for hybrid Azure AD joined devices)
# This eliminates the need for PKI infrastructure
# Requires Azure AD Kerberos module
Import-Module AzureADHybridAuthenticationManagement
# Create Azure AD Kerberos Server object in on-premises AD
$domain = "corp.local"
$cloudCredential = Get-Credential -Message "Enter Azure AD Global Admin credentials"
$domainCredential = Get-Credential -Message "Enter on-premises Domain Admin credentials"
Set-AzureADKerberosServer `
-Domain $domain `
-CloudCredential $cloudCredential `
-DomainCredential $domainCredential
# Verify Kerberos Server object
Get-AzureADKerberosServer -Domain $domain -CloudCredential $cloudCredential `
-DomainCredential $domainCredential
Write-Host "Cloud Kerberos Trust configured for hybrid WHfB deployment"
Step 4: Register FIDO2 Security Keys for Users
Implement security key registration workflow:
# Bulk FIDO2 security key registration via Temporary Access Pass
# Step 1: Issue Temporary Access Pass for key registration
function Issue-TemporaryAccessPass {
param(
[string]$UserId,
[int]$LifetimeMinutes = 60,
[bool]$IsUsableOnce = $true
)
$tap = @{
"@odata.type" = "#microsoft.graph.temporaryAccessPassAuthenticationMethod"
lifetimeInMinutes = $LifetimeMinutes
isUsableOnce = $IsUsableOnce
}
$result = New-MgUserAuthenticationTemporaryAccessPassMethod `
-UserId $UserId `
-BodyParameter $tap
return @{
UserId = $UserId
TemporaryAccessPass = $result.TemporaryAccessPass
ExpiresAt = $result.CreatedDateTime.AddMinutes($LifetimeMinutes)
}
}
# Bulk issue TAPs for security key registration event
$registrationUsers = Import-Csv "security_key_registration_list.csv"
$tapResults = foreach ($user in $registrationUsers) {
$tap = Issue-TemporaryAccessPass -UserId $user.UserPrincipalName
[PSCustomObject]@{
User = $user.UserPrincipalName
TAP = $tap.TemporaryAccessPass
Expires = $tap.ExpiresAt
KeySerial = $user.AssignedKeySerial
}
}
# Export TAPs for secure distribution to registration team
$tapResults | Export-Csv "tap_assignments.csv" -NoTypeInformation
# Monitor FIDO2 registration progress
function Get-Fido2RegistrationStatus {
$allUsers = Get-MgUser -All -Property "id,userPrincipalName,department"
$registrationStatus = foreach ($user in $allUsers) {
$methods = Get-MgUserAuthenticationFido2Method -UserId $user.Id
[PSCustomObject]@{
UserPrincipalName = $user.UserPrincipalName
Department = $user.Department
Fido2KeyCount = $methods.Count
KeyModels = ($methods.Model -join ", ")
RegistrationDates = ($methods.CreatedDateTime -join ", ")
HasBackupKey = $methods.Count -ge 2
}
}
return $registrationStatus
}
$status = Get-Fido2RegistrationStatus
$total = $status.Count
$registered = ($status | Where-Object { $_.Fido2KeyCount -gt 0 }).Count
$withBackup = ($status | Where-Object { $_.HasBackupKey }).Count
Write-Host "FIDO2 Registration Progress"
Write-Host " Total Users: $total"
Write-Host " Registered: $registered ($([math]::Round($registered/$total*100,1))%)"
Write-Host " With Backup: $withBackup ($([math]::Round($withBackup/$total*100,1))%)"
Step 5: Disable Legacy Authentication Methods
Phase out phishable authentication factors:
# Disable SMS and voice call authentication
$smsPolicy = @{
"@odata.type" = "#microsoft.graph.smsAuthenticationMethodConfiguration"
state = "disabled"
}
Update-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicyAuthenticationMethodConfiguration `
-AuthenticationMethodConfigurationId "sms" `
-BodyParameter $smsPolicy
$voicePolicy = @{
"@odata.type" = "#microsoft.graph.voiceAuthenticationMethodConfiguration"
state = "disabled"
}
Update-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicyAuthenticationMethodConfiguration `
-AuthenticationMethodConfigurationId "voice" `
-BodyParameter $voicePolicy
# Block legacy authentication protocols via Conditional Access
$blockLegacyPolicy = @{
displayName = "Block Legacy Authentication"
state = "enabled"
conditions = @{
users = @{ includeUsers = @("All") }
applications = @{ includeApplications = @("All") }
clientAppTypes = @(
"exchangeActiveSync",
"other"
)
}
grantControls = @{
operator = "OR"
builtInControls = @("block")
}
}
New-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy -BodyParameter $blockLegacyPolicy
# Audit users still using legacy authentication
$legacyAuthReport = Get-MgAuditLogSignIn -Filter "clientAppUsed ne 'Browser' and clientAppUsed ne 'Mobile Apps and Desktop clients'" `
-Top 1000 | Group-Object userPrincipalName | Select-Object Count, Name |
Sort-Object Count -Descending
Write-Host "Users with Legacy Auth (last 30 days):"
$legacyAuthReport | Format-Table -AutoSize
Step 6: Monitor Passwordless Adoption Metrics
Track deployment progress and authentication method usage:
# Generate passwordless adoption dashboard data
function Get-PasswordlessAdoptionMetrics {
# Authentication method registration statistics
$registrationReport = Get-MgReportAuthenticationMethodUserRegistrationDetail -All
$metrics = @{
TotalUsers = $registrationReport.Count
PasswordlessCapable = ($registrationReport | Where-Object { $_.IsPasswordlessCapable }).Count
MfaRegistered = ($registrationReport | Where-Object { $_.IsMfaRegistered }).Count
Fido2Registered = ($registrationReport | Where-Object { "fido2" -in $_.MethodsRegistered }).Count
WhfbRegistered = ($registrationReport | Where-Object { "windowsHelloForBusiness" -in $_.MethodsRegistered }).Count
AuthenticatorRegistered = ($registrationReport | Where-Object { "microsoftAuthenticator" -in $_.MethodsRegistered }).Count
SmsOnly = ($registrationReport | Where-Object {
"sms" -in $_.MethodsRegistered -and
"fido2" -notin $_.MethodsRegistered -and
"windowsHelloForBusiness" -notin $_.MethodsRegistered
}).Count
}
# Authentication method usage from sign-in logs
$signInLogs = Get-MgAuditLogSignIn -Top 10000 -Filter "createdDateTime ge $((Get-Date).AddDays(-30).ToString('yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ssZ'))"
$authMethodUsage = $signInLogs |
Group-Object { $_.AuthenticationMethodsUsed -join "," } |
Select-Object Count, Name | Sort-Object Count -Descending
return @{
Registration = $metrics
Usage = $authMethodUsage
}
}
$adoption = Get-PasswordlessAdoptionMetrics
$reg = $adoption.Registration
Write-Host "PASSWORDLESS ADOPTION REPORT"
Write-Host "============================"
Write-Host "Total Users: $($reg.TotalUsers)"
Write-Host "Passwordless Capable: $($reg.PasswordlessCapable) ($([math]::Round($reg.PasswordlessCapable/$reg.TotalUsers*100,1))%)"
Write-Host " FIDO2 Keys: $($reg.Fido2Registered)"
Write-Host " Windows Hello: $($reg.WhfbRegistered)"
Write-Host " Authenticator: $($reg.AuthenticatorRegistered)"
Write-Host "MFA Registered: $($reg.MfaRegistered) ($([math]::Round($reg.MfaRegistered/$reg.TotalUsers*100,1))%)"
Write-Host "SMS Only (needs upgrade): $($reg.SmsOnly)"
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|
| FIDO2 | Fast Identity Online 2 standard enabling passwordless authentication using public-key cryptography bound to hardware authenticators or platform credentials |
| Passkey | FIDO2 credential that can be device-bound (security key) or synced across devices, providing phishing-resistant authentication without passwords |
| Windows Hello for Business | Windows platform authenticator using PIN, fingerprint, or facial recognition backed by TPM-protected asymmetric keys for passwordless sign-in |
| Cloud Kerberos Trust | Deployment model for hybrid WHfB that uses Azure AD Kerberos to authenticate to on-premises resources without requiring PKI certificate infrastructure |
| Temporary Access Pass | Time-limited passcode issued by admins enabling users to register passwordless methods or recover access when their primary method is unavailable |
| Authentication Strength | Conditional Access capability in Microsoft Entra that specifies which authentication method combinations satisfy MFA requirements for a given policy |
Tools & Systems
- Microsoft Entra Admin Center: Portal for configuring authentication methods, Conditional Access policies, and monitoring sign-in analytics
- Microsoft Intune: MDM/MAM platform for deploying Windows Hello for Business configuration profiles to managed devices
- Microsoft Graph API: Programmatic interface for managing authentication methods, policies, and generating adoption reports
- FIDO2 Security Keys: Hardware authenticators (YubiKey, Feitian, Google Titan) storing cryptographic credentials for phishing-resistant authentication
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Enterprise-Wide Passwordless Migration
Context: Organization with 5,000 users plans to eliminate passwords within 12 months after experiencing a phishing attack that compromised 47 accounts. Current state: 60% use SMS MFA, 30% use Authenticator app, 10% have no MFA.
Approach:
- Phase 1 (Month 1-2): Enable FIDO2 and WHfB authentication methods in report-only Conditional Access
- Phase 2 (Month 2-3): Deploy WHfB to all managed Windows devices via Intune with Cloud Kerberos Trust
- Phase 3 (Month 3-5): Distribute FIDO2 security keys to executives, IT admins, and finance (highest-risk users first)
- Phase 4 (Month 5-8): Enable Authenticator passkeys for mobile-primary users and field workers
- Phase 5 (Month 8-10): Switch Conditional Access from report-only to enforced for phishing-resistant auth
- Phase 6 (Month 10-12): Disable SMS and voice call methods, block legacy authentication protocols
- Ongoing: Monitor adoption metrics, issue TAPs for stragglers, maintain break-glass accounts
Pitfalls:
- Not deploying Cloud Kerberos Trust causes WHfB to fail for on-premises resource access in hybrid environments
- Enforcing passwordless without ensuring all applications support modern authentication breaks access
- Issuing only one security key per user without a backup creates lockout risk if the key is lost
- Not configuring Temporary Access Pass as a recovery method before disabling password-based sign-in
Output Format
PASSWORDLESS AUTHENTICATION DEPLOYMENT REPORT
================================================
Tenant: corp.onmicrosoft.com
Users: 5,247
Deployment Phase: Phase 4 (Authenticator Passkeys)
AUTHENTICATION METHOD REGISTRATION
Passwordless Capable: 4,103 / 5,247 (78.2%)
FIDO2 Security Keys: 892 (17.0%)
Windows Hello: 2,847 (54.3%)
Authenticator Passkey: 1,234 (23.5%)
Certificate-Based: 312 (5.9%)
LEGACY METHOD STATUS
SMS-Only Users: 387 (7.4%) -- migration in progress
Voice-Only Users: 0 (disabled)
No MFA Users: 42 (0.8%) -- TAPs issued
CONDITIONAL ACCESS
Phishing-Resistant Policy: ENFORCED (all users except exclusion group)
Legacy Auth Block: ENABLED
Admin Portal Policy: SECURITY KEY REQUIRED
SIGN-IN ANALYTICS (Last 30 Days)
Total Sign-Ins: 847,293
Passwordless: 623,891 (73.6%)
Password + MFA: 198,402 (23.4%)
Password Only: 0 (blocked)
Legacy Protocol: 0 (blocked)
SECURITY IMPACT
Phishing Incidents: 0 (down from 47 pre-deployment)
Password Reset Tickets: -82% reduction
Avg Sign-In Time: 8.2s (passwordless) vs 24.1s (password)
